F. Daybreak restricted capability + security-review contract #122
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Creatidy/scarcity-router#122
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Child F of #116 (Dynamic Execution Sources program).
Daybreak Blue classification
Live runtime advertises
gpt-daybreak-blue-latest. Treat as a special RESTRICTED security capability, not a normal Luna/Sol/Astra track. Approximate classification:security_review/restricted_access/defensive_security. Re-verify current OpenAI documentation during implementation. Do not invent provider permissions.Required design properties:
Security-review-gate contract
For work explicitly classified
security_critical, an independent audit usinggpt-daybreak-blue-latestis mandatory when the platform claims completion of that workflow. Boundary discipline: Scarcity Router is a routing/execution system, NOT a general multi-stage agent orchestrator — do NOT fake a multi-stage audit by routing one primary request through Daybreak. Determine the narrow correct architectural boundary; if multi-stage workflow belongs outside the Routing Core, keep it there and document the boundary.Minimum durable contract usable by Program Execution Mode:
If required access is unavailable:
SECURITY_REVIEW_UNAVAILABLEand the gate remains OPEN/FAILED. No silent substitute model.Program's own gate
#116 is classified security_critical. After normal GLM-5.3-Flash review + remediation, run an independent
gpt-daybreak-blue-latestreview through an approved available source challenging: credential isolation between two Codex sources; source-id confusion; resource ownership; inventory spoofing; server-to-worker privilege expansion; model alias confusion; exact target substitution; auth-state confusion; malicious/oversized inventory; quota-pool cross-account confusion; worker protocol authorization; sensitive account metadata leakage; audit correctness; TLS/auth boundaries. If Daybreak access cannot be exercised, recordSECURITY_REVIEW_UNAVAILABLEand pause final completion at that external/human gate.Closeout — implemented in merged PR #124 (merge commit
a4370f0intodevelop, head9789c67; program #116 / D-053).Child F delivered:
gpt-daybreak-blue-latestis classified as a RESTRICTED track (openai/daybreak,security_review/restricted_access/defensive_securitysemantics) — discovery never proves authorization, restricted models are shown honestly in inventory but never materialized as routable resources, never substituted, and never consumed by ordinary acceptance. The durable security-review contract is recorded in AGENTS.md and docs/llm-operating-policy.md:security_critical→ independentgpt-daybreak-blue-latestreview required;SECURITY_REVIEW_UNAVAILABLEwhen access cannot be exercised; no silent substitutes; the multi-stage review stays outside the Routing Core.Program gate record: the Daybreak review RAN through the real controlled source (three segmented passes) and returned FAIL with 8 blockers — all 8 blocker classes were remediated in the authorized pass with discriminating regressions. The final narrow verification was incomplete due to the WSLg/bubblewrap reviewer-environment failure; the owner explicitly waived that incomplete verification. It is NOT recorded as a Daybreak PASS — the review record stands as: executed, blockers found and remediated, final verification waived by the owner.