Add opt-in installed SR–MI integration #8

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kilo merged 1 commit from issue/1-installed-sr-mi into main 2026-11-01 19:22:05 +00:00
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Refs #1. Experimental Linux local-TLS integration only; do not merge as M0/M1 acceptance.

  • Build an SR image from canonical f96d58e6d7d0fffdbe70476850d824efa5de2fb5 with its pinned MI d65891668b7e79f7b666c021f02a1b4bf8c4ca9c extra.
  • Guard explicit protected MI inputs, independently provided digest and image ID, use read-only file binds and SR's existing --mi-config; retain the default non-MI path.
  • Source-pinned build is experimental, not reproducible: base and dependencies remain mutable. Operator must independently authenticate the reference and image and protect host files; manual Docker restarts and SR admin reload bypass Foundry preflight.

Validation: 34 unit tests run (30 pass, 4 Docker tests skipped in that run); separate no-MI Docker suite 4/4 passes. Isolated target-host synthetic integration used image sha256:1225eacbec52d7ef0e5f039e1b5d2fdf64069c9774cc23aaa4d9379c15f71c32: protected onboarding, verified HTTPS, authenticated selection, retained internal utilization verification, failed reload retaining prior cut, and adopted recreation passed. Fresh/expired/withdrawn labels were verified in installed synthetic consumer tests; withdrawal was exercised via server reload. No positive live-provider applicability or inference claimed. Independent review identified and fixes addressed Compose entrypoint, literal path and exposure issues.

Remaining before acceptance: the relationship between the authorization-filtered HTTP response and the retained internal decision has not been independently verified. SR can persist a candidate MI cut before subsequent TLS startup failure; see Creatidy/scarcity-router#245. Stale/withdrawn evidence rejection against a matching installed resource remains unproven. Trust bootstrap, image provenance, and other M0/M1 criteria remain open. No merge requested.

Refs #1. Experimental Linux local-TLS integration only; do not merge as M0/M1 acceptance. - Build an SR image from canonical `f96d58e6d7d0fffdbe70476850d824efa5de2fb5` with its pinned MI `d65891668b7e79f7b666c021f02a1b4bf8c4ca9c` extra. - Guard explicit protected MI inputs, independently provided digest and image ID, use read-only file binds and SR's existing `--mi-config`; retain the default non-MI path. - Source-pinned build is experimental, not reproducible: base and dependencies remain mutable. Operator must independently authenticate the reference and image and protect host files; manual Docker restarts and SR admin reload bypass Foundry preflight. Validation: 34 unit tests run (30 pass, 4 Docker tests skipped in that run); separate no-MI Docker suite 4/4 passes. Isolated target-host synthetic integration used image `sha256:1225eacbec52d7ef0e5f039e1b5d2fdf64069c9774cc23aaa4d9379c15f71c32`: protected onboarding, verified HTTPS, authenticated selection, retained internal utilization verification, failed reload retaining prior cut, and adopted recreation passed. Fresh/expired/withdrawn labels were verified in installed synthetic consumer tests; withdrawal was exercised via server reload. No positive live-provider applicability or inference claimed. Independent review identified and fixes addressed Compose entrypoint, literal path and exposure issues. **Remaining before acceptance:** the relationship between the authorization-filtered HTTP response and the retained internal decision has not been independently verified. SR can persist a candidate MI cut before subsequent TLS startup failure; see https://forgejo.creatidy.com/Creatidy/scarcity-router/issues/245. Stale/withdrawn evidence rejection against a matching installed resource remains unproven. Trust bootstrap, image provenance, and other M0/M1 criteria remain open. No merge requested.
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Validation against exact HEAD 6c94489438e25874c8a1472be055840883d69a38: clean source-pinned image build and combined Foundry suite 34 passed, 0 skipped, including the four Docker runtime tests. Source SR f96d58e6d7d0fffdbe70476850d824efa5de2fb5, MI pin d65891668b7e79f7b666c021f02a1b4bf8c4ca9c, tested image sha256:7894b7428c1637627f3af2b879866f2eae9cef4d7f47367389684e5a20e1efcb (mutable base/dependencies; not a reproducible release).

Review evidence: prior independent review's tracked diff blob IDs match HEAD for Makefile, README, and local_tls_up.py; its final then-untracked files had no review-time hashes. A fresh, independently invoked GLM-5.3 review narrowly covered that uncovered gate against HEAD tree 750749c8d62f59a8698a31e9bd6934f7a65c853f: Dockerfile.mi blob decfada66820322a80d6088c9a1fe67a2cd98037 and tests/test_mi_opt_in.py blob d5db59844244e28b1256d3de3711e3c16d852912; it reported no new findings. This comment records the review evidence, not a Forgejo approval or a substitute for server-enforced policy.

Separate installed authorization testing registered two synthetic resources and verified retained internal utilization, but both choices were unsupported/no-solution because configured resources expose null reasoning effort. A no-solution response redacted a restricted resource; public response and retained internal decision do not directly verify as the same MI decision envelope. Positive authorization-filtered choice, fresh/stale/withdrawn behavior against an eligible resource and the applicable lifecycle gate SR #245 remain unverified. Experimental integration only, not M0/M1 acceptance.

Validation against exact HEAD `6c94489438e25874c8a1472be055840883d69a38`: clean source-pinned image build and combined Foundry suite **34 passed, 0 skipped**, including the four Docker runtime tests. Source SR `f96d58e6d7d0fffdbe70476850d824efa5de2fb5`, MI pin `d65891668b7e79f7b666c021f02a1b4bf8c4ca9c`, tested image `sha256:7894b7428c1637627f3af2b879866f2eae9cef4d7f47367389684e5a20e1efcb` (mutable base/dependencies; not a reproducible release). Review evidence: prior independent review's tracked diff blob IDs match HEAD for Makefile, README, and local_tls_up.py; its final then-untracked files had no review-time hashes. A fresh, independently invoked GLM-5.3 review narrowly covered that uncovered gate against HEAD tree `750749c8d62f59a8698a31e9bd6934f7a65c853f`: Dockerfile.mi blob `decfada66820322a80d6088c9a1fe67a2cd98037` and tests/test_mi_opt_in.py blob `d5db59844244e28b1256d3de3711e3c16d852912`; it reported no new findings. This comment records the review evidence, not a Forgejo approval or a substitute for server-enforced policy. Separate installed authorization testing registered two synthetic resources and verified retained internal utilization, but both choices were unsupported/no-solution because configured resources expose null reasoning effort. A no-solution response redacted a restricted resource; public response and retained internal decision do not directly verify as the same MI decision envelope. Positive authorization-filtered choice, fresh/stale/withdrawn behavior against an eligible resource and the applicable lifecycle gate [SR #245](https://forgejo.creatidy.com/Creatidy/scarcity-router/issues/245) remain unverified. Experimental integration only, not M0/M1 acceptance.
kilo merged commit 83a5b63057 into main 2026-11-01 19:22:05 +00:00
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