Add opt-in installed SR–MI integration #8
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Refs #1. Experimental Linux local-TLS integration only; do not merge as M0/M1 acceptance.
f96d58e6d7d0fffdbe70476850d824efa5de2fb5with its pinned MId65891668b7e79f7b666c021f02a1b4bf8c4ca9cextra.--mi-config; retain the default non-MI path.Validation: 34 unit tests run (30 pass, 4 Docker tests skipped in that run); separate no-MI Docker suite 4/4 passes. Isolated target-host synthetic integration used image
sha256:1225eacbec52d7ef0e5f039e1b5d2fdf64069c9774cc23aaa4d9379c15f71c32: protected onboarding, verified HTTPS, authenticated selection, retained internal utilization verification, failed reload retaining prior cut, and adopted recreation passed. Fresh/expired/withdrawn labels were verified in installed synthetic consumer tests; withdrawal was exercised via server reload. No positive live-provider applicability or inference claimed. Independent review identified and fixes addressed Compose entrypoint, literal path and exposure issues.Remaining before acceptance: the relationship between the authorization-filtered HTTP response and the retained internal decision has not been independently verified. SR can persist a candidate MI cut before subsequent TLS startup failure; see Creatidy/scarcity-router#245. Stale/withdrawn evidence rejection against a matching installed resource remains unproven. Trust bootstrap, image provenance, and other M0/M1 criteria remain open. No merge requested.
Validation against exact HEAD
6c94489438e25874c8a1472be055840883d69a38: clean source-pinned image build and combined Foundry suite 34 passed, 0 skipped, including the four Docker runtime tests. Source SRf96d58e6d7d0fffdbe70476850d824efa5de2fb5, MI pind65891668b7e79f7b666c021f02a1b4bf8c4ca9c, tested imagesha256:7894b7428c1637627f3af2b879866f2eae9cef4d7f47367389684e5a20e1efcb(mutable base/dependencies; not a reproducible release).Review evidence: prior independent review's tracked diff blob IDs match HEAD for Makefile, README, and local_tls_up.py; its final then-untracked files had no review-time hashes. A fresh, independently invoked GLM-5.3 review narrowly covered that uncovered gate against HEAD tree
750749c8d62f59a8698a31e9bd6934f7a65c853f: Dockerfile.mi blobdecfada66820322a80d6088c9a1fe67a2cd98037and tests/test_mi_opt_in.py blobd5db59844244e28b1256d3de3711e3c16d852912; it reported no new findings. This comment records the review evidence, not a Forgejo approval or a substitute for server-enforced policy.Separate installed authorization testing registered two synthetic resources and verified retained internal utilization, but both choices were unsupported/no-solution because configured resources expose null reasoning effort. A no-solution response redacted a restricted resource; public response and retained internal decision do not directly verify as the same MI decision envelope. Positive authorization-filtered choice, fresh/stale/withdrawn behavior against an eligible resource and the applicable lifecycle gate SR #245 remain unverified. Experimental integration only, not M0/M1 acceptance.